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The Future of Securitization
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ
Securitization, a process in which firms can raise low-cost financing
by efficiently allocating asset risks with investor appetite for risk, has been
one of the most dominant and fastest-growing means of capital formation
in the United States and the world. The subprime financial crisis,
however, has revealed certain defects with how securitization is sometimes
utilized. This Article examines these defects and the extent they can, and
should, be remedied going forward.
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The Future of Securitization
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the future viability of securitization in light of
its involvement in the subprime-mortgage financial crisis (“subprime
crisis”).1 The Article concludes that securitization should, and indeed
likely will, have a viable if not vibrant future. There are many reasons for
this. Securitization efficiently allocates risk with capital. It enables
companies to access capital markets directly, in most cases at lower cost
than the cost of issuing direct debt (such as bonds or commercial paper),
and it avoids middleman inefficiencies. Moreover, when the securitized
assets are loans, securitization helps to transform the loans into cash from
which banks and other lenders can make new loans.2
These positives might be outweighed, however, by securitization’s
negatives revealed by the subprime crisis. There are four such potential
negatives: subprime mortgages may be a flawed asset type that should not
have been securitized; the originate-to-distribute model of securitization
might create moral hazard; securitization can create servicing conflicts; and
securitization can foster overreliance on mathematical models. This
Article examines these negatives and the extent to which they can be
∗

Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of Law; Founding/CoAcademic Director, Duke Global Capital Markets Center. E-mail: schwarcz@law.duke.edu. The
Author thanks participants in the University of Connecticut, Law Review Symposium, “The Subprime
Crisis: Going Forward,” as well as Thomas Burns, Anupam Chander, Edward Janger, Jason Kravitt,
and Thomas Plank, for helpful comments on this symposium article.
1
Securitization refers to the process of turning financial assets into securities issued by a special
purpose vehicle. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
133, 135 (1994).
2
See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET
SECURITIZATION §1:1, §§11:1–11:2 (3d ed. & supps. 2008); Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization PostEnron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1565 (2004) (concluding why securitization should “create[] net
value [even] for unsecured creditors”); Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph Mason, Credit Card
Securitization and Regulatory Arbitrage 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Pa., Working Paper No. 03-7, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=569862 (finding that the empirical
evidence for credit card securitization “is more consistent with the efficient contracting view . . . of
securitization”); see also JASON KRAVITT, FOREWORD: SOME THOUGHTS ON WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO
THE CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIZATION AND WHERE SECURITIZATION IS GOING 3–4 (2008),
available at http://www.pli.edu/public/17984/foreword.pdf (arguing that “securitized products, when
structured properly and used wisely, have the potential to be one of the most valuable financial
innovations of the modern financial era”); Martin Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An
Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis 7 (Nov. 2008 preprint of the Max Planck Institute
for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, No. 2008/43), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1309442
(explaining why “the securitization of [residential real estate] risks should be regarded as a good idea”).
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remedied in the future.
The subprime crisis also revealed a possible fifth negative: investors in
securitization transactions—essentially pension funds, mutual funds, hedge
funds, banks, insurance companies, and other institutional investors3—may
over-rely on rating-agency ratings.4
To follow the analysis below, the reader should note the following
terminology. Subprime mortgage securitization, the type of securitization
whose failure initially triggered the chain of failures that became the
subprime crisis,5 is a subset of mortgage securitization. In the most basic
form of mortgage securitization, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are
issued by a special-purpose vehicle (SPV),6 and payment on the securities
is derived directly from collections on mortgage loans owned by the SPV.
More complex forms of mortgage-backed securities include collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) securities in which payment derives directly from a
mixed pool of mortgage loans and sometimes, also, from other financial
assets owned by the SPV; and “ABS CDO” securities in which payment
derives from MBS and CDO securities owned by the SPV (and thus
indirectly from the mortgage loans and other financial assets underlying
those owned securities).7 Subprime mortgage securitization can mean any
of these types of mortgage securitization where all or a portion of the
underlying financial assets consists of subprime mortgage loans.8
Prior to the subprime crisis, most MBS, CDO, and ABS securities
were highly rated by rating agencies.9
II. WHAT WENT WRONG, AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE FIXED?
This Article identifies certain potential negatives of securitization
revealed by the subprime crisis and examines the extent to which these
negatives can be remedied in the future.

3

GREENWICH ASSOCIATES, SURVEY OF SECURITIZATION MARKET INVESTORS 2 (2005).
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox,
2002 U. ILLINOIS L. REV. 1, 2–5, 8 (2002) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets]
(providing an introduction to ratings, rating agencies, and the ratings process). For an analysis of the
integrity of the ratings process and of the extent that investors should appropriately rely on ratings, see
Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown,
93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 380–82 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets]. The
extent of appropriate reliance on ratings, and indeed the integrity of the ratings process itself, are
questions beyond this Article’s scope.
5
For an examination of how a market failure can trigger a chain of failures resulting in a financial
crisis, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 194–200 (2008) (providing several
examples of individual market failures causing a domino effect across several markets or industries).
6
An SPV is sometimes called a special-purpose entity, or “SPE.” Schwarcz, Protecting
Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 376.
7
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 376–77.
8
See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
9
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 106.
4
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A. Flawed Asset Type
Subprime mortgage securitization failed, initially triggering the chain
of failures that became the subprime crisis, because of the particular and
almost unique nature of the underlying subprime mortgage loans. These
are high-interest-rate home mortgage loans made to risky borrowers.10
Many of these borrowers relied on refinancing their appreciating home
values to repay their loans.11 This model was successful as long as home
prices appreciated,12 as they had been doing for decades.13
However, when home prices stopped appreciating and began
collapsing, those borrowers were unable to refinance. Furthermore, many
subprime mortgage loans had adjustable rates which increased after an
initial “teaser” period.14 Borrowers who could not afford the rate increases
had expected to refinance at lower interest rates.15 That likewise was
stymied by collapsing home prices. As a result, many risky borrowers
began defaulting, causing some of the highly rated MBS, CDO, and ABS
CDO securities—whose payment depended on collections from the
underlying financial assets16—to default or to have their credit ratings
downgraded.17 These defaults and downgrades, in turn, caused investors in
rated securities to begin losing confidence in the financial markets.18
The failure of subprime mortgage securitization was thus caused by its
almost absolute dependence on home appreciation. Some believe this
sensitivity to the decline in housing prices was unique.19 From that
perspective, parties structuring securitization transactions can minimize
future problems by excluding, or at least limiting and better managing,

10

Although subprime mortgage loans were sometimes made to affluent borrowers in amounts that
may be difficult for such borrowers to repay, a significant amount of subprime mortgage loans were
made to non-affluent or poor borrowers. To some extent this followed the U.S. Government’s strong
encouragement of lenders to make mortgage loans to low-income, often disproportionately minority,
borrowers; to some extent it also may have reflected greed due to the high interest rates charged to
risky borrowers. Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the ‘Subprime’ Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009).
11
Id.
12
This model’s viability also relied on interest rates not rising so high as to make refinancing
uneconomic. Although the subprime crisis was not caused by rising interest rates, the model’s
additional susceptibility to rate risk buttresses the view that any securitization of subprime mortgage
loans should be limited and better managed. See infra notes 19–20 and accompanying text (discussing
the management of risks caused by subprime mortgages).
13
Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 2.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (introducing different types of mortgage-backed
securities).
17
Schwarcz, supra note 10. The CDO and especially ABS CDO securities were particularly hard
hit because of their highly magnified leverage. Id.
18
Schwarcz, supra note 10.
19
Gary B. Gorton, The Panic of 2007 67 (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 08-24, 2008), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1255362.
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subprime mortgage loans as an eligible type of underlying financial asset,20
and also by conservatively assessing the payment prognosis for other types
of financial assets underlying securitizations.21 This is important not only
to protect the integrity of securitization transactions but also to avoid the
unintended consequence that securitization of a flawed asset type can
motivate greater origination of that asset type, effectively magnifying the
flaw.
This is not to say these procedures will be failsafe. Parties to, and
investors in, securitization transactions must always be diligent to
recognize and try to protect against the possibility that the underlying
financial assets might, as in the case of subprime mortgage loans, fail in
unexpected ways. What would happen to automobile loan securitizations,
for example, if a technological innovation makes cars obsolete, depriving
even financially healthy borrowers of the incentive to repay their loans?22
The invention of a new form of personal transportation is at least as
plausible as the idea that home prices—which generally had only risen
since the 1930s—would suddenly collapse in value at a rate higher than
that seen during the Great Depression, as happened in the subprime crisis.23
The subprime crisis also teaches us the danger of mixing politics and
finance. Before the crisis, there was political pressure to securitize risky
subprime mortgage loans to facilitate financing for the poor.24 We might
see the same type of future political pressure, for example, to securitize
risky microfinance loans to facilitate financing for the poor and
disadvantaged.
B. Originate-to-Distribute Moral Hazard
Some argue that securitization facilitated an undisciplined mortgage
lending industry.25 By enabling mortgage lenders to sell off loans as they
20

Any such managing should also take into account rate risk.
Assessments of payment prognosis should, bottom line, strive to be as accurate as possible.
But where a prognosis has a margin of error, perhaps one should err, in structuring transactions, on the
more conservative side of that margin.
22
I am not suggesting that auto loans might be a flawed asset type but merely illustrating how
underlying financial assets could fail in unexpected ways. Even if financially healthy borrowers lost
their incentive to repay auto loans, they could be sued for payment and—unlike subprime mortgage
borrowers—would have the means to pay. Such lawsuits, though, would generate relatively high
transaction costs which, if not recoupable from the collateral or the borrowers, would reduce funds
available to pay the securitized notes.
23
Compare, for example, the fear around turn of the century New York City, before the invention
of the automobile, that horse manure would create a public health hazard. See JOHN DUFFY, A
HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW YORK CITY 1866–1966, at 126–27 (1974); Clay McShane & Joel
A. Tarr, The Centrality of the Horse in the Nineteenth-Century American City, in THE MAKING OF
URBAN AMERICA 105, 120–21 (Raymond A. Mohl, ed., 2d ed. 1997).
24
See supra note 10.
25
See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, How to Stop the Mortgage Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2008, at
A15, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (describing lax lending standards that gave rise
to mortgages with loan-to-value ratios of nearly 100% and citing the 1.8 million mortgages then in
21

2009]

THE FUTURE OF SECURITIZATION

1319

were made (a concept called “originate-to-distribute” or “originate-anddistribute”), securitization is said to have created moral hazard since these
lenders did not have to live with the credit consequences of their loans.26
Mortgage underwriting standards therefore fell, exacerbated by the fact
that mortgage lenders could make money on the volume of loans
originated.27
I find the moral hazard argument weak. Mortgage underwriting
standards may have fallen, but there are other explanations. For example,
lower standards may well reflect distortions caused by the liquidity glut of
that time, in which lenders competed aggressively for business and allowed
28
otherwise defaulting home borrowers to refinance. They also may reflect
conflicts of interest between firms and their employees in charge of setting
those standards, such as where employees were paid for booking loans
29
regardless of the loans’ long-term performance. Blaming the originateto-distribute model for lower mortgage underwriting standards also does
not explain why standards were not similarly lowered for originating nondefault); David Henry & Matthew Goldstein, The Bear Flu: How it Spread, BUS. WK., Dec. 31, 2007,
at 30, available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File (arguing that the distance between mortgageloan originators and the ultimate holders of the loans encouraged lax lending); cf. John C. Dugan,
Speech Given at The Annual Convention of The American Bankers Association, Oct. 8, 2007, at 5,
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2007-109a.pdf (observing that with the increasing use
of the originate-to-distribute model of lending, lending standards shifted from evaluating the likelihood
of repayment to evaluating the likelihood that the loan could be sold). But cf. Gorton, supra note 19, at
67–68 (disagreeing with this explanation, although observing that the originate-to-distribute model and
resulting moral hazard are the “dominant explanation” for the financial panic); Effi Benmelech,
Jennifer Dlugosz, & Victoria Ivashina, What Lies Beneath: A Look Inside CLO Collateral 2, available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1344068 (finding, empirically, that bank loans that are securitized
perform no worse than bank loans that are held).
26
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 387–88.
27
See, e.g., Legislative and Regulatory Options for Minimizing and Mitigating Mortgage
Foreclosures: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Serv., 110th Cong. 74 (2007), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:39540.pdf
(statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve System) (“When an originator sells a mortgage
. . . much or all of the risks are passed on to the loan purchaser. Thus, originators who sell loans may
have less incentive to undertake careful underwriting . . . .”). There is also speculation that some
mortgage-loan originators might have engaged in fraud by manipulating borrower income, and that
some borrowers may have engaged in fraud by lying about their income, in each case to qualify
borrowers for loans. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, A Cross-Country Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2007,
at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (noting the recent practice of mortgage companies
giving out loans based on limited documentation). If such fraud occurred, it would exacerbate but is
unlikely to be significant enough to have caused the subprime financial crisis.
28
See Ravi Balakrishnan et al., Globalization, Gluts, Innovation or Irrationality: What Explains
the Easy Financing of the U.S. Current Account Deficit? 5 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
07/160, 2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07160.pdf (discussing the
liquidity and savings glut).
29
See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of SecondaryManagement Agency Costs (work-in-progress, on file with the Connecticut Law Review); Steven L.
Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV., Issue 2 (forthcoming
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1240863 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Regulating
Complexity] (arguing that conflicts of interest independent of the originate-to-distribute model,
involving ordinary agency costs, as well as a combination of herd mentality and complacency, can
explain the lowered investing standards).
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mortgage financial assets used in other types of securitization
30
Nor does it explain why the ultimate owners of the
transactions.
mortgage loans—the investors in the mortgage-backed securities—did not
govern their investments by the same strict lending standards that they
31
would observe but for the separation of origination and ownership.
Although I do not believe the originate-to-distribute model was a
32
material cause of the subprime crisis, the model may need fixing to avoid
its perception as the cause. There is little question, though, that the model
should remain largely intact. It is critical to the underlying funding
liquidity of banks and corporations.33 Furthermore, scholars have at least
tentatively concluded that, despite the subprime crisis, it has created value
34
in the financial markets. The goal therefore should be to minimize any
potential moral hazard resulting from the originate-to-distribute model
without undermining the model’s basic utility.
There are various ways this could be done. Potential moral hazard
problems could be managed, for example, by requiring mortgage lenders
35
and other originators to retain some realistic risk of loss.
30

Gorton, supra note 19, at 73–74.
See generally William P. Alexander, et al., Some Loans are More Equal than Others: ThirdParty Originations and Defaults in the Subprime Mortgage Industry (2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=281233 (finding that although agency problems
between lenders and third-party originators of subprime mortgage loans appear to make certain thirdparty-originated loans more likely to default, that higher default rate becomes recognized and priced in
the loan interest rate).
32
Jason Kravitt likewise believes that the originate-to-distribute model was not a material cause
of the subprime crisis. KRAVITT, supra note 2, at 22. He argues that the parties involved in subprime
mortgage securitization transactions suffered serious losses and ruined reputations, and hence there was
no moral hazard. That does not obviate the possibility, though, that moral hazard motivated those
parties to act as they did. Moral hazard must be judged ex ante, not ex post.
33
See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 388 n.74 (citing Joseph R. Mason, Assoc. Professor of
Fin. & LeBow Research Fellow, Lebow Coll. of Bus., Drexel Univ., Presentation to the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland: Mortgage Loan Modification: Promises and Pitfalls (Nov. 20, 2007))
(presentation notes on file with author) (showing that fifty-eight percent of mortgage liquidity in the
United States, and seventy-five percent of mortgage liquidity in California has come from structured
finance).
34
See Xudong An et al., Value Creation Through Securitization: Evidence from the CMBS
Market 3 (SSRN Working Paper No. 1095645, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1095645 (“Despite recent constraints on secondary market funding and liquidity,
securitization appears to have created value in financial markets.”).
35
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 116; cf. Jan Pieter Krahnen &
Guenter Franke, The Future of Securitization (SSRN, Working Paper No. 1284989, 2008), available at
http://www.ifk-cfs.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/wp/08_31.pdf (arguing for the importance of
equity piece retention). Requiring originators to retain a risk of loss, however, is a two-edged sword
because it also can create a “mutual misinformation” problem. See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity,
supra note 29, at 16−18 (observing that many underwriters of ABS CDO and other complex mortgagebacked securities did not fully understand the risks associated with their retained tranches, thereby
signaling unjustified confidence in the securities being sold). Professor Mason also has argued that
originator risk retention can create “cliff risk.” Joseph R. Mason, Cliff Risk and the Credit Crisis 12–
14 (SSRN, Working Paper No. 1296250, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296250.
31

2009]

THE FUTURE OF SECURITIZATION

1321

In many non-mortgage securitization transactions, for
example, it is customary for originators to bear a direct risk
of loss by overcollateralizing the receivables sold to the
36
SPV. This was not always done in mortgage securitization
because mortgage loans traditionally are overcollateralized
by the value of the borrower’s equity in the real-estate
37
and thus investors can effectively be
collateral,
overcollateralized even if the originator bears no separate risk
of loss.38
Moral hazard problems also could be managed by regulating the loan
underwriting standards applicable to mortgage lenders.
The U.S.
government took this type of approach, for example, in response to the
margin loan underwriting failures that helped trigger the Great Depression.
When stock values began depreciating in 1929, margin loans (that is, loans
to purchase publicly-listed stock) became undercollateralized, resulting in
39
a high loan default rate which, in turn, caused bank lenders to fail. To
protect against a recurrence of this problem, the Federal Reserve
promulgated margin regulations G, U, T, and X, requiring margin lenders
to maintain two-to-one collateral coverage when securing their loans by
margin stock that has been purchased, directly or indirectly, with the loan
40
proceeds.
A similar type of approach, such as imposing a minimum real-estatevalue-to-loan collateral coverage ratio on all mortgage loans secured by the
real estate financed, would protect against a repeat of the subprime crisis.
This protection would come at a high price, however, potentially impeding
and increasing the cost of home ownership and imposing an administrative
41
Nor would it protect
burden on lenders and government monitors.
against different types of financial crises that might arise in the future.42
Any regulatory approach, to be viable, should have to demonstrate that its
benefits are at least likely to exceed its costs.43
36

Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 116.
In subprime mortgage securitizations, though, borrowers are not always required to put in
equity. Investors therefore would have had greater justification in asking originators to bear a direct
risk of loss by overcollateralizing subprime mortgage loans sold to SPVs.
38
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 116. For an analysis of why
investors and other parties, such as credit insurers, who, as a result of the originate-to-distribute model,
ultimately bore the risk of loss in subprime mortgage securitizations did not adequately monitor the
underlying mortgage loans, see Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 117;
Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 29, at 16.
39
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 107−08.
40
12 C.F.R. § 221.3 (2008).
41
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 118 (examining this approach as well
as other types of mortgage loan suitability standards).
42
Id. at 111.
43
Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 234–35.
37
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C. Servicing Conflicts
There is general agreement that mortgage securitization has made it
difficult to work out problems with the underlying mortgage loans because
the beneficial owners of the loans are no longer the mortgage lenders but a
broad universe of financial-market investors in the MBS and other
securities. Although servicers theoretically bridge the gap between
investors (as beneficial owners of the loans) and the mortgage lenders,
retaining the power to restructure the underlying loans “in the best
interests” of those investors, the reality is problematic.
Servicers may be reluctant to engage in restructuring if there is
uncertainty that their transactions will generate sufficient excess cash flow
to reimburse their costs, whereas all foreclosure costs are reimbursed.44
Servicers also may sometimes prefer foreclosure over restructuring
because the former is more ministerial and thus has a lower litigation risk.
In many CDO and ABS CDO mortgage securitization transactions, cash
flows deriving from principal and interest are separately allocated to
different investor tranches.45 Therefore, a restructuring that, for example,
reduces the interest rate, would adversely affect investors in the interestonly tranche, leading to what some have called “tranche warfare.”46
These problems—which currently are mostly confined to mortgage
securitization47—can, and in the future should, be fixed. Parties should
write underlying deal documentation that sets clearer and more flexible
guidelines and more certain reimbursement procedures for loan
restructuring, especially when restructuring appears to be superior to
foreclosure.48 They also should try to minimize allocating cash flows to
investors in ways that create conflicts.49 And consideration should be
given to protecting servicers, whether contractually or through legislation,
from liability for taking actions in good faith, akin to the business
44

Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 121.
The classes, or “tranches,” of securities issued in securitization transactions are “typically
ranked by seniority of payment priority.” Id. at 105.
46
Id. at 121.
47
Id. at 116.
48
In the subprime crisis, the underlying deal documentation is already in place and cannot be
easily renegotiated. The government therefore might consider legislating changes, recognizing that any
such changes that are subsidized in whole or part by government could foster moral hazard, potentially
making future homeowners more willing to take risks when borrowing. Another approach, with less
potential for moral hazard, is for government to legislatively insulate servicers from liability for taking
actions in good faith, akin to the business judgment rule applied to performance of corporate directors.
Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 59
ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1040–41 (2008) (explaining why indenture trustees on public bonds, presently
obligated to act under a “prudent man” standard, should be protected by this rule). With this
protection, servicers are more likely to engage in restructuring if, in their judgment, they believe that
restructuring is likely to maximize overall value.
49
Cf. AMERICAN SECURITIZATION FORUM ET AL., RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN THE
SECURITIZATION MARKETS 7 (2008) [hereinafter RESTORING CONFIDENCE] (recommending
harmonizing and improving securitization servicing standards).
45
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50

judgment rule applied to performance of corporate directors. With this
protection, servicers would be more likely to engage in restructuring if, in
their judgment, they believe that restructuring is likely to maximize overall
value.
D. Overreliance on Mathematical Models
To some extent the subprime crisis resulted from an abandonment of
common sense and an overreliance on complex mathematical models.51
Models are essential to securitization because of the need to statistically
predict what future cash flows will become available from the underlying
financial assets to pay the securities issued by the SPV.52
Models can bring insight and clarity. If the model is realistic and the
inputted data are reliable, models can yield accurate predictions of real
events. However, if the model is unrealistic or the inputted data are
unreliable, models can be misleading—creating the danger of “garbage in,
garbage out.”53
Subprime mortgage securitization models relied on assumptions and
historical data which, in retrospect, turned out to be incorrect and therefore
made the valuations incorrect.54 The models incorrectly assumed, for
example, that housing would not depreciate in value to the levels presently
seen.55 Valuation errors were further compounded to the extent subprime
mortgage loans increasingly were made with innovative terms, such as
adjustable rates, low-to-zero down payment requirements, interest-only
payment options, and negative amortization.56 These terms were so
50

See supra note 48.
Cf. Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard 23 (SSRN,
Working Paper No. 2009-W-01, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1292476 (observing that underlying the subprime financial crisis “was an enormous faith in the
market’s ability to analyze and measure risk”). Some of the overreliance may reflect that the
complexity of the mortgage-backed securities made it difficult for investors to fully appreciate the risks
they were incurring, tempting them to rely on such imperfect substitutes as rating-agency ratings and
the results of mathematical models. Cf. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 29, at 32–40
(discussing why disclosure failed in the subprime crisis and the consequences of such failure).
52
Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 29, at 16–17 (discussing how statistical models
utilized by monolines did not adequately test for the scenario of rapidly falling house prices, which led
to many mono lines losing their AAA ratings).
53
Cf. Emanuel Derman & Paul Wilmott, Perfect Models, Imperfect World, BUS. WK., Jan. 12,
2009, at 59, available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File (discussing cash-flow modeling and
concluding that, “[a]t bottom, financial models are tools for approximate thinking, a way to help
transform one’s intuition about the future into a” useable number).
54
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 4, at 398; see also Eugene Ludwig,
Founder and CEO, Promontory Fin. Group, 10th William Taylor Memorial Lecture at the International
Conference of Banking Supervisors 3 (Sept. 25, 2008) (stating that “it is widely accepted” now that the
subprime mortgage securitization models used by rating agencies and other market participants relied
on “insufficient data and faulty assumptions”).
55
See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.
56
EDWARD VINCENT MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGES: RISKS TO
CONSUMERS AND LENDERS IN THE CURRENT HOUSING CYCLE 2 (2006), available at
51
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complex that some borrowers did not fully understand the risks they were
incurring.57 As a result, they defaulted at a much higher rate than would be
predicted by the historical mortgage-loan default rates relied on by loan
originators in extending credit.58
Securitization models also have been used, sometimes erroneously, to
substitute for real market information. For example, some CDO and ABS
CDO securities did not have an active trading market, so investors instead
relied on mark-to-model valuation of these securities. When assumptions
underlying the models turned out to be wrong,59 investors panicked
because they did not know what the securities were worth.60
In theory, this overreliance on mathematical models is self-correcting
because the subprime crisis, by its existence, has shaken faith in the
market’s ability to analyze and measure risk through models.61
Securitization products are likely to be confined, at least in the near future,
to those that can be robustly modeled. The only question will be the
longevity of the lesson that future risks cannot always be predicted through
mathematical models.62
III. CONCLUSIONS
Because securitization, properly utilized, is an efficient financial tool,63 its
future should be assured no matter how investors or politicians might temporarily
overreact. Nor should they overreact. As Professor Gorton observes,
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33775_20061227.pdf.
57
PATRICIA A. MCCOY & ELIZABETH RENUART, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, HARVARD
UNIV., THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF SUBPRIME AND NONTRADITIONAL HOME MORTGAGES 17
(2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/understanding_consumer_credit/
papers/ucc08-5_mccoy_renuart.pdf.
58
Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil: Examining the Role of Securitization: Hearing Before the
S. Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance and Investments, 110th Cong. 3–4 (2007) (statement of Kurt
Eggert, Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law), available at http://banking.senate.
gov/public/_files/eggert.pdf; EDWARD GOLDING, RICHARD K. GREEN, & DOUGLAS A. MCMANUS,
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., IMPERFECT INFORMATION AND THE HOUSING
FINANCE CRISIS 14 (2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/
understanding_consumer_credit/papers/ucc08-6_golding_green_mcmanus.pdf.
59
Some of these wrong assumptions are discussed supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
60
Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 29, at 18; cf. RESTORING CONFIDENCE, supra
note 49, at 7 (recommending the improvement of independent valuation procedures). This may include
procedures for the valuation of securitized products that will not have active markets.
61
Cf. supra note 51 (discussing the overreliance on faulty risk models by investors).
62
Cf. Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject To Change Without Notice, BUS. WK.,
Mar. 29, 1993, at 34, available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File (discussing that within years
after the Marriott “split,” investors favor higher interest rates over “event-risk” covenants, once the
examples of events justifying the covenants have receded in memory).
63
See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 146 (discussing the cost-efficiency of securitization); supra note
2 and accompanying text (discussing the efficiency of securitization); see also Gorton, supra note 19, at
75 (concluding that “[s]ecuritization is an efficient, incentive-compatible, response to bankruptcy costs
and capital requirements”); Ethan Penner, The Future of Securitization, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2008, at
A15, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (observing that “[s]ecuritization will continue to
play an important role—if adapted appropriately”).
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[t]here are no such issues [as occurred in the subprime crisis]
with securitization generally, or with the use of off-balance
sheet vehicles for the securitization of those [other] asset
classes. Other securitizations are not so sensitive to the
prices of the underlying assets and so they are not so
susceptible to bubbles.64
Nonetheless, in the near future at least, it is likely that securitization
transactions will need to refocus on basic structures and asset types in
order to attract investors.65 In particular, there will likely be an emphasis
on cash-flow securitizations in which there are the traditional “two-ways
out.”66 Furthermore, we are not likely to see many highly complex
securitization products, like CDO and ABS CDO transactions, which
magnify leverage.67
In the medium term, securitization’s future will be at least marginally
influenced by the extent to which the intrinsic values of mortgage-backed
securities turn out to be worth more than their market values. I have
argued that, as a result of irrational panic, the market prices of mortgagebacked securities collapsed substantially below the intrinsic value of the
mortgage loans underlying those securities.68 A large differential would
indicate that the problem was more investor panic than intrinsic lack of
worth.
Whether securitization will remain vibrant and inventive in the long
term, however, will turn on our ability to better understand the problems of
complexity, which was at the root of many of the failures that gave rise to
the subprime crisis.69
64

Gorton, supra note 19, at 67.
See generally Douglas Gale, Standard Securities, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 731 (1992) (arguing
that the cost of becoming informed about unfamiliar securities may lead to gains from standardizing
securities); Andrew Davidson, Reinventing Securitization: If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It. But What if It
is Broken?, THE PIPELINE, Feb. 2008, http://www.ad-co.com/newsletter/2008/Feb08/Credit.htm
(advocating simpler securitization structures).
66
In contrast, subprime mortgage securitizations had only one way out: home appreciation. See
Schwarcz, supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text (discussing how home appreciation allowed
mortgagors to refinance to lower mortgage rates). Similarly, we are unlikely to see many securitization
transactions with balance sheet motivations. Cf. KRAVITT, supra note 2, at 14–15 (observing that
“when securitization becomes an end in itself as opposed to a needed source of financing, certainly
there is at least the potential for abuse”).
67
Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 10; supra text accompanying notes 61–62. For a more detailed
prediction of how practices will improve in the securitization industry, see KRAVITT, supra note 2, at
23–25.
68
Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 23 n.75 (estimating the intrinsic value by examining the mortgage
loans underlying the securities and ascertaining which were subprime, which were prime, and which
were delinquent or in default).
69
See supra notes 6–7, 44–46, 51, 57–58 and accompanying text (indicating where problems of
complexity contributed to the subprime crisis); cf. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 29, at
2–4 (examining how the complexities of modern financial markets and investment securities can trigger
market failures).
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